Crises in Lebanon are escalating as a result of the Israeli war and the ongoing attacks on Lebanese territory, particularly in the southern regions. This war is also reverberating internally, intensifying political tensions and deepening divisions over all issues related to the conflict. As a result, narratives and discourses dominated by the language of violence, hatred, accusations of treason, and mutual blame have emerged. This reality is reflected in the media landscape, with all the consequences it carries for Lebanese society, which is becoming increasingly fragile under the weight of these widespread narratives.

 

With every political, security, or media-related event, debate is renewed over the concept of “hate speech,” the limits of freedom of expression, and the role of the state and the media in regulating such discourse.

 

This debate has become particularly prominent in recent months. In the absence of a unified international definition of hate speech, a central challenge emerges: how to confront inflammatory and violent discourse without turning the concept into a tool for restricting freedom of opinion and expression or prosecuting critical and opposition voices. This also raises questions about the boundary between shocking or provocative expression and direct incitement that may threaten individual rights or civil peace.

 

This report examines the legal and media-related challenges associated with hate speech by reviewing international standards, the Rabat Plan of Action, comparative European approaches, as well as the Lebanese context and the provisions included in the proposed new media law.

 

Hate Speech: The Absence of a Unified Definition

Despite the growing use of the term “hate speech” in political, media, and judicial discussions, there is still no unified and internationally agreed definition of the concept. This makes its classification and the determination of its legal boundaries a complex matter, shaped by varying political, social, and cultural contexts.

 

In this context, the regional director of the ARTICLE 19 office in the Middle East and North Africa, Salwa Ghazouani, stated in an interview with Maharat Foundation that: “ARTICLE 19, along with all organizations working on hate speech issues, including United Nations bodies and human rights organizations, has not established a unified definition of hate speech. In other words, there is no internationally agreed definition, because the issue is difficult to define. However, ARTICLE 19 relies on certain standards within a visual pyramid to identify and assess hate speech.”

 

Dr. Zahera Harb, Head of International Journalism at City, University of London, also confirms the absence of a universal definition of hate speech, noting that approaches differ according to the social, political, and cultural contexts of each country or region.

 

As for Amnesty International, it bases its definition of hate speech on international human rights standards, particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, under which freedom of expression may only be restricted in narrow and highly specific circumstances. The principle, according to Reina Wehbi, Amnesty International's Lebanon Campaigner, is that freedom of expression encompasses a broad spectrum of opinions, including those that may be shocking, provocative, or even offensive.

 

Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights legally prohibits any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence.

 

Classifying Speech: Between Protected Expression and Incitement to Hatred

Based on the above, international and human rights organizations rely on a set of criteria to assess speech and determine whether it falls within the scope of protected expression or within categories of speech that may warrant restriction or criminalization.

 

In this context, Salwa Ghazouani explains that ARTICLE 19 has developed a visual pyramid to classify forms of speech according to their severity and potential impact on individuals and groups. According to this classification, speech that directly incites discrimination, hostility, or violence occupies the top of the pyramid. This is the type of speech referred to in Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and may warrant criminalization.

 

The middle of the pyramid includes harmful and discriminatory speech containing stereotypes, misinformation, and indirect incitement. Such speech does not necessarily warrant criminal punishment and may instead be addressed through other measures that help prevent the misuse of hate speech as a pretext for limiting freedom of opinion and expression, particularly in contexts where freedom of expression is often sacrificed.

 

At the base of the pyramid are shocking or provocative opinions and sharp political criticism. This type of speech is considered protected under international frameworks safeguarding freedom of opinion and expression, particularly Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

 

In this context, Reina Wehbi notes that “the condemned speech must demonstrate hatred toward a particular national, ethnic, or religious group; it must include a clear intent to incite others to discriminate against, show hostility toward, or commit violence against the targeted group; and there must be a likelihood that others would commit such violence or other harm. In addition, a clear and direct link must be established between the speech/expression and this violence or other harm. In other words, merely expressing sharp or critical opinions, even if offensive, does not justify restricting them unless they rise to the level of incitement threatening the rights or safety of others.”

 

Expanding the Interpretation of Hate Speech: A Restriction on Freedom of Opinion and Expression

The forms of speech that may contain elements of hatred are diverse, and, as will be discussed below, the methods for addressing such speech also vary. At the same time, it remains essential to ensure that freedoms are not suppressed under the banner of combating hate speech. In this regard, Reina Wehbi states that “the concept of ‘hate speech’ becomes a tool that undermines freedom of expression when it is defined in a vague manner that allows authorities to use it against opposition voices or critical journalistic coverage, rather than limiting it to genuine incitement to violence or discrimination.”

 

She explains that “international standards are clear in this area: not every shocking, provocative, or harsh statement constitutes hate speech. Freedom of expression also protects opinions that may disturb or provoke controversy, particularly in sensitive political and media contexts.”

 

Regarding the distinction between hate speech and defamation, Zahera Harb explains that “defamation and slander are offenses punishable by law, but they are not necessarily classified as hate speech, whereas hate speech is assessed according to the level of abuse or incitement that may lead to psychological or physical harm.”

 

In the same context, Salwa Ghazouani adds that “many countries in the region have adopted cybercrime laws that include provisions criminalizing speech involving incitement to hatred, without establishing any standards enabling us to determine when such speech should actually be classified as hate speech. These articles and laws often include prison sentences, which is considered highly dangerous.”

 

At the same time, some forms of speech may indeed contain elements of discrimination or hatred. Here, the importance of addressing such discourse without resorting to criminal penalties or imprisonment becomes evident. Ghazouani highlights a series of measures that can help limit such speech:

- Self-regulation by media outlets through journalistic codes of ethics and internal institutional policies.

- Self-regulation through press councils: although experiences in this area have not always been encouraging, their role remains essential in awareness-raising, education, and limiting such discourse.

- Alerting journalists within media institutions: contrary to common assumptions, this is considered an important way to reduce violent discourse, as journalists generally care about their reputation and professional record.

- Financial fines.

 

 

At the societal level, Ghazouani stresses that “greater freedom helps us confront hate speech. A context that guarantees freedom of expression, combined with media and information literacy training, awareness campaigns, and the dissemination of counter-speech by civil society organizations, can raise collective awareness about hate speech. This can ultimately lead to a ‘societal response’ to violent and hateful discourse, signaling that such speech is irresponsible and creating mutual awareness among citizens.”

 

When Does Speech Become a Crime?

In the absence of a unified definition of hate speech, international standards play a crucial role in assessing speech and determining when it may justify restriction or criminalization, particularly in cases involving incitement to violence, discrimination, or hostility.

 

In this context, the United Nations’ Rabat Plan of Action is considered one of the key international reference frameworks for evaluating hate speech. It introduced the so-called “six-part test,” designed to distinguish between protected expression and speech that may amount to punishable incitement. 

 

This test is based on six main criteria:

- Context of the statement or speech: examining the political and social environment in which the speech is delivered or published.

- Status of the speaker: the social role and influence of the speaker or their organization within the audience’s environment.

- Intent: assessing the relationship between the purpose of the speech, its subject matter, and its audience.

- Content of the statement or speech: analyzing how provocative, direct, and explicit the speech is in both form and style.

- Extent of dissemination: evaluating the reach of the speech, its public nature, and the size of its audience.

- Likelihood of harm: determining the probability and imminence of harm resulting from the speech.

 

 

Reina Wehbi notes that “the Rabat Plan of Action is of central importance in distinguishing between lawful expression and incitement that warrants accountability, as it provides a precise analytical framework that prevents arbitrary expansion of criminalization. Its importance lies in raising the threshold for criminal liability, ensuring it is applied only to the most serious forms of speech that pose a real and imminent risk. It also ensures that hate speech is assessed in its full context, rather than through a superficial reading of texts or statements. For this reason, Amnesty International calls for the Rabat Plan to be used as a guiding reference when drafting or applying laws related to incitement, in order to protect freedom of expression and prevent misuse of such laws.”

 

In the same vein, Salwa Ghazouani explains that “the Rabat Plan provides a very important framework for addressing harmful speech through a six-part test, where all six criteria are difficult to satisfy simultaneously. For example, there may be a tense religious and socio-political context, but if the speaker lacks influence, why impose a prison sentence? In other words, if one criterion is not met, custodial punishment should not apply. Similarly, one must examine the content: does it directly call for hatred? In addition, it is necessary to assess the likelihood of harm and other criteria set out in the Rabat Plan.”

 

The European Approach: Protecting Freedom of Expression While Criminalizing Only Serious Cases of Incitement

In comparative perspective, Media and Journalism Research Center director Marius Dragomir notes that the European approach treats hate speech as a narrowly defined limitation on freedom of expression, rather than an exception that overrides the broad protection afforded to this right. The European system is grounded in the fundamental principle that freedom of expression also protects opinions that may be shocking, provocative, or disturbing, a principle consistently upheld in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.

 

Dragomir explains that the European Union criminalizes certain forms of hate speech, but within a narrow and clearly defined scope, based on the 2008 EU Framework Decision on combating racism and xenophobia. This framework obliges member states to criminalize public incitement to hatred or violence when directed against groups defined by race, color, religion, descent, or national or ethnic origin. The decision also covers the public denial or justification of genocide and crimes against humanity.

 

 

He adds that this European framework was primarily designed to punish serious forms of incitement linked to racism and xenophobia, while simultaneously safeguarding freedom of expression and freedom of association, notably through the application of a proportionality test when imposing any restriction on expression.

 

According to Dragomir, European courts typically assess restrictions on freedom of expression through three key questions:

- Is the restriction clearly prescribed by law?

- Does it pursue a legitimate aim?

- Is it necessary and proportionate in a democratic society?

 

Dragomir warns against the expansion of criminal sanctions related to hate speech, as this may have a chilling effect on public debate. He emphasizes the importance of limiting criminalization to cases of direct and serious incitement, and of clearly distinguishing hate speech from defamation and slander, which many European countries are gradually decriminalizing.

 

He argues that key lessons for Lebanon include adopting a narrow and precise definition of hate speech linked to direct incitement rather than insult or criticism, distinguishing hate speech from defamation, and incorporating the principle of proportionality to ensure that any restrictions on expression are the least restrictive possible.

 

The New Media Law Proposal: An Approach That Regulates Criminalization in Line with International Standards

Alongside legal and media debates on hate speech, a different approach has emerged in the latest version of Lebanon’s draft new media law, discussed by the subcommittee formed under the Parliamentary Administration and Justice Committee.

 

It was agreed within the subcommittee and later within the Administration and Justice Committee to abolish prison sentences and pre-trial detention in cases related to freedom of expression and publication, replacing them with civil liability before competent civil courts. This applies equally to journalists and citizens, based on the principle of protecting the act of expression itself, regardless of the status of the individual.

 

Regarding hate speech, the Administration and Justice version maintained narrow and specific exceptions related to incitement to racism or hatred, and directly linked criminalization to the standards set out in the United Nations’ Rabat Plan of Action. Under this framework, incitement must be serious and direct, and the likelihood of harm or violence must be high, thereby limiting the risk of overly broad criminalization or vague interpretations used against freedom of expression.

 

The same version also shifted defamation cases from the criminal framework to civil liability, through amendments to the Penal Code and their linkage to the Code of Obligations and Contracts. This reform aligns with international standards and with recommendations from the UN Human Rights Council regarding the protection of freedom of expression and the abolition of custodial penalties in publication and expression-related offenses.

 

This approach represents one of the most significant shifts in the latest draft of the law, as it reinforces the distinction between hate speech linked to direct and serious incitement, and critical expression or reputation-related disputes such as defamation and libel, which are now addressed under civil rather than criminal liability.

 

Roula Mikhael confirms that the importance of the approach adopted in the latest version of the draft media law lies in “linking any criminalization of hate speech to clear and specific standards based on the Rabat Plan of Action, in order to prevent the expansion of this concept to restrict freedom of expression or to target critical voices under vague labels.”

 

However, the fate of the draft media law remains uncertain, particularly after the reopening of discussions within parliamentary joint committees and the formation of a new subcommittee to re-examine certain provisions, despite years of deliberation on its latest version. This process has raised concerns among several media and human rights actors about possible delays or setbacks in the proposed reforms, especially those related to the abolition of custodial sentences, the regulation of hate speech in line with international standards, and the strengthening of safeguards for freedom of expression. For more on the path of the draft media law in Lebanon, see the report: “The Media Law Process in Lebanon: Between Legislative Progress and Reopening the Debate”

 

The Lebanese Context: Between the Need for Regulation and the Risk of Restricting Freedom of Expression

The debates that have taken place in Lebanon in recent months around certain media content and satirical content reflect the complexity of dealing with hate speech in a highly sensitive political and sectarian context, where the boundaries between political criticism, provocative expression, and incitement are sometimes blurred. This occurs against the backdrop of the absence of a clear and updated legal framework capable of precisely defining these distinctions.

 

This controversy became particularly visible following a caricature video published by the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International (LBCI) on 1 May 2026, which triggered a broad political and media debate over the limits of freedom of expression and whether it should be classified as hate speech or protected satirical political expression.

 

The LBCI Video: Between Hate Speech and Satirical Expression

On 1 May 2026, LBCI published a caricature video inspired by the game Angry Birds, depicting Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem as a “bird” character facing Israeli soldiers portrayed as pigs. The video sparked widespread controversy and criticism, particularly from those who considered it offensive to religious symbolism associated with Qassem’s turban, while others viewed it as protected political satire.

 

The controversy led to official and judicial action. The Minister of Information, Paul Morcos, stated that the video constituted hate speech and exceeded the limits of freedom of expression. The channel was subsequently summoned before the Cybercrime Bureau upon referral by the Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation, before the video was removed and an investigation was opened.

 

In this context, Reina Wehbi emphasizes that international standards require clear safeguards to prevent the concept of hate speech from becoming a tool used to restrict freedom of expression. Any restriction, she notes, must meet the criteria of legality, necessity, and proportionality, and must constitute the least restrictive means available. The burden lies on judicial authorities to demonstrate that such a restriction is truly necessary and that no less restrictive alternative exists, as well as to justify the legitimate aim pursued, rather than applying such measures in a vague or selective manner to silence criticism or dissent.

 

Conversely, Dr. Zahera Harb argues that the video cannot be separated from the Lebanese context, characterized by deep sectarian and political divisions. She notes that the reactions it provoked also contributed to generating reciprocal inflammatory discourse that may further exacerbate tensions and violence.

 

Harb stresses that the impact of speech is not determined solely by its content, but also by the broader context in which it is disseminated, as well as the proliferation  of sectarian and confessional rhetoric within the Lebanese media landscape.

 

While she underscores the need to curb harmful forms of expression, Harb maintains that punitive and custodial approaches are not the solution, advocating instead for alternative accountability mechanisms such as self-regulation, fines, and content removal when necessary—particularly given the limited effectiveness of the National Council for Audiovisual Media and its inability to enforce its mandate effectively.

 

In contrast, Legal Agenda provided a legal analysis of the case, arguing that handling the matter through security channels constitutes a violation of the principle that journalists should not be summoned before security agencies, warning against consolidating this approach in publication-related cases under the pretext of urgency. It further considered that the video falls within the scope of protected satirical political criticism, and that classifying any form of speech as incitement requires the presence of clear intent and an actual and direct risk of harm - elements that, according to its assessment, are not present in this case. At the same time, Legal Agenda noted that the reactions that followed the video also slid into religious and inflammatory discourse, underscoring the need for a clear legal framework that precisely distinguishes between protected expression and incitement that may threaten civil peace.

 

These concerns are echoed by Maharat Foundation in one of its Trends Watch Alerts reports, which found that the reactions following the caricature video exposed the fragility of national unity and a heightened level of tension and polarization in Lebanon, alongside real risks to civil peace. The report also noted that the controversy went beyond differences in opinion or political expression, reflecting a rise in patterns of mutual accusation and incitement on digital platforms. It further warned of growing concerns that concepts related to the protection of civil peace or national unity could be used to justify restrictions on critical voices and freedom of expression.

 

Following the preliminary investigation, the Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation, Judge Ahmad Rami al-Hajj, decided on 15 May 2026 to dismiss the complaint against LBCI and its officials due to the absence of any criminal offense. He considered that the caricature video fell within the scope of freedom of expression and did not contain religious insult or defamation of any party, but rather portrayed Hezbollah as representing “good” in contrast to the Israeli “evil.”

 

In contrast, he ordered the prosecution of individuals who had circulated offensive images of Patriarch Bechara Boutros al-Rai, considering that these materials constituted incitement and provocation of sectarian tensions that could threaten civil peace.

 

The growing debate in Lebanon over hate speech reflects the complexity of regulating expression in a highly sensitive political and sectarian context, particularly in light of war and deep divisions. Between the need to address inciting and violent discourse and the risk of using the concept of hate speech to restrict criticism and dissent, there is a clear need for a legal framework grounded in international standards that precisely distinguishes between direct incitement to violence and protected political or critical expression.

 

These discussions also highlight the importance of advancing the adoption of a new media law that provides clear safeguards for freedom of expression, establishes a balanced approach to hate speech that avoids security-based responses and overly broad criminalization, and reinforces reflection on the responsibility of media outlets in managing sensitive discourse within Lebanon’s public sphere.