Why does this debate matter to every citizen?

Every news article you read, every bulletin you follow, and every talk show that shapes your opinion on a public issue inevitably passes through a media institution that has an owner. This owner, whoever they may be, possesses the direct or indirect ability to influence what news and opinions reach you, and what is withheld from you. Hence, the ongoing debate today within the Parliament regarding the new proposed media law, specifically concerning the concentration of media ownership, is not merely a technical matter that concerns only the owners of media institutions and their investors. Rather, it is an issue that directly touches upon every citizen's right to access diverse and independent information and opinions, to know who has the power to shape public discourse, as well as what information reaches citizens and how it is presented to them.

 

At the core of this debate emerges Article 8  of the proposed law, which sets a maximum ceiling of 10% for a single person's ownership in audiovisual media. This article has sparked a sharp divergence in positions: between those who consider it an exaggerated restriction on the freedom of investment, and those who see it as a fundamental guarantee to limit monopolies and protect media pluralism. However, a review of comparative experiences and legal opinions shows that the real question is not limited to whether the 10% threshold is high or low, but extends to a much deeper issue: how can the concentration of media power in the hands of a limited number of individuals be prevented, regardless of the number written in the law, especially since the effectiveness of this tool remains linked to the law's ability to uncover actual control and apply transparency rules?

 

During the meeting of the parliamentary subcommittee emanating from the joint parliamentary committees on June 5, 2026, which was dedicated to reviewing the final version of the law, the debate once again focused on a set of fundamental reforms, foremost among them the mechanism for appointing members of the new media council and the proposed restrictions on the ownership of audiovisual media. The articles related to the ownership of television and radio institutions stipulate a set of controls aimed at limiting monopolies, most notably prohibiting any natural or legal person from owning more than 10% of the shares of the company owning the media outlet, whether directly or indirectly, in addition to prohibiting the ownership of more than one television station and one radio station. However, these restrictions raised questions within the committee regarding the possibility of applying them practically in the Lebanese media market, amid calls from some MPs to reconsider or ease them.

 

The debate is not limited to the ownership percentage itself, but extends to the entity that will oversee the application of these provisions. The proposed law entrusts the National Media Council with the task of auditing ownership structures, monitoring institutions' compliance with the specified rules, and taking legal action in the event of violations. However, the effectiveness of these mechanisms remains linked to the independence of the authority itself, in light of the ongoing dispute over the method of appointing its members and the possibility of it being subjected to political influences. This debate also raises the issue of uncovering the beneficial owners and ultimate beneficiaries , as control over a media institution may be exercised through intermediary companies or financial arrangements that do not appear in official ownership records.

 

Why should this debate matter to us as citizens? 

At first glance, discussions about share ownership thresholds and the appointment procedures for regulatory bodies may seem like technical matters far removed from citizens' everyday lives.  However, the truth is exactly the opposite. Every decision a Lebanese citizen makes—who to vote for, which economic policy to support, and how to evaluate the performance of officials—is largely based on information provided by the media. If media outlets are concentrated in the hands of a limited number of owners linked to political or economic interests, the citizen gradually loses the diversity of voices necessary to form an independent opinion, without this necessarily being obvious to them.

 

This is not a theoretical assumption in the Lebanese case. According to the Media Ownership Monitor Lebanon 2024, more than 80% of the media outlets covered by the study are directly or indirectly linked to political figures or forces, while more than 70% of the owners analyzed are linked to politicians, parties, or influential public figures. In other words, the image that the Lebanese citizen receives about their country through their screens and radios is produced, in large part, from within the very political establishment that the media is supposed to monitor. 

 

Marius Dragomir, a European expert at the Media and Journalism Research Center (MJRC), explains that understanding the importance of this issue begins with a simple question every citizen should ask themselves: Who actually owns the media outlet I follow daily? Media outlets, according to him, are not merely commercial activities like any other; they are the source through which people learn about what is happening around them, and they rely on the information provided to form their opinions and take stances. When a limited number of owners control the bulk of the institutions followed by the public, the diverse picture of reality shrinks, and media institutions become more similar in their content and discourse, while issues affecting the interests of the owners themselves may be marginalized, which narrows the audience's choices without it often being obvious to them.

 

Dragomir cites the experience of Hungary as an example of what can happen when this diversity erodes: the government there did not impose direct censorship on the media, but rather allowed businessmen close to it to acquire a large number of media institutions before merging hundreds of them into a single entity. The result was that local newspapers across the country started publishing the exact same stories, with the same headlines and photos, and often at the same time, appearing diverse in form but actually limited in their diversity of content. He concludes that press freedom is not only about what journalists can publish, but also about who owns the platforms through which these opinions and information are published.

 

Therefore, the debate around Article 8 is not a technical discussion confined to legal experts and investors, but a debate that fundamentally concerns who determines what you know, and what you do not know, about your country.

 

What does the new proposed media law include? 

The new proposed media law includes four main sections. The first section addresses the ownership of media institutions and related transparency requirements, while the second section focuses on the technical aspects specific to various media institutions. The third section deals with the body overseeing the media sector, namely the National Media Council, while the fourth section is considered one of the most important sections of the law, as it addresses the content of media material, including the right of reply and correction, fake news, and libel and defamation. In this context, the new law retained the penal nature regarding the most dangerous offenses and violations that impact society and public opinion, while transferring the majority of violations to the civil framework, thereby abolishing criminal prosecutions and pre-trial detention in these cases.

 

The proposed new law allows non-Lebanese nationals to own media institutions, while establishing controls that determine the permitted percentages of such ownership. It also reaffirms a set of rules aimed at preventing the concentration of media ownership in the hands of a single investor or a limited number of investors. Under the proposal, no investor would be allowed to own more than three media institutions, provided that these are one institution of each type. Allowing foreign ownership of media outlets under specific regulations could strengthen Lebanon’s position as an attractive hub for investment in the media sector and its development, particularly amid the transformations affecting the industry, which has become increasingly global in nature as most media outlets have shifted to online broadcasting. This highlights the importance of establishing a legal environment in Lebanon that supports local, regional, and international investment, while being based on professional and ethical standards that ensure the quality of media content and provide a framework conducive to freedom of opinion and expression, thereby reinforcing Lebanon’s role as a media capital in the Middle East. 

 

Funding: The Most Ambiguous Link in the Equation 

When people talk about the ownership of a media outlet, they usually think of whoever's name appears in the shareholders' register. However, the Lebanese experience, as documented by the report prepared by the Maharat Foundation titled "Media Transparency Under Threat: Addressing Opacity and Undue Influence through Reforms," shows that the money keeping the media institution afloat, not just the shares registered in the names of their owners, is what actually determines who holds the decision-making power within it. Media institutions, unlike many commercial companies, require continuous funding that often exceeds what they generate from commercial revenues: production costs, salaries, technical infrastructure, and licensing fees. When commercial revenues are insufficient to cover these costs, the institution becomes dependent on loans, advertising deals, or financial support from parties that may not appear at all in the official ownership register. This is where the core issue lies: the funding party, even if not an owner in the legal sense, often wields greater influence than the official owner, because the institution's continuity and its ability to broadcast or publish depend on them.

 

According to the Maharat report, the funding of media outlets remains one of the most ambiguous aspects of the Lebanese media sector, given the absence of regular disclosure of funding sources, weak transparency regarding political advertisements, and a lack of clarity regarding the forms of financial support some institutions receive, as well as the difficulty in distinguishing between commercial investment and funding with political objectives.

 

The report emphasizes that the actual funder can often be more influential than the official owner of the media institution. This explains why legislation that merely sets a ceiling on the percentage of shares can remain incapable of achieving its goal: a media institution might literally comply with the 10% ceiling stipulated in the law, while remaining, in practice, hostage to continuous funding from a single political or economic entity that dictates its editorial line without its name appearing in any official register. Therefore, the Maharat report concludes that addressing the concentration of ownership is not limited to setting a legal ownership ceiling, but also requires empowering the regulatory body to uncover the actual owners, real beneficiaries, and funding sources. Even the strictest legal restrictions may become ineffective if they can be circumvented through indirect ownership, or if the entity tasked with oversight lacks independence and execution capability.

 

The report also points out that the most prominent issues in the Lebanese legal framework are the absence of an integrated system to disclose the beneficial owner, the possibility of using companies or legal arrangements to conceal the actual owner, in addition to the weak updating of ownership data, and the limited availability of information related to ownership and funding to public opinion. The report considers that current Lebanese legislation does not provide adequate protection against the concentration of media ownership, which allows influential political and economic groups to maintain widespread influence within the media landscape, whether through direct or indirect ownership, family and political ties, shared economic interests, or influence resulting from funding or administrative control.

 

An Intersectional Issue: Why is determining the ownership percentage alone not enough? 

It is clear from the above that addressing the concentration of media ownership is not a simple equation that can be solved just by setting a single number, such as 10% or any other percentage. Media concentration is a highly intersectional phenomenon, in which multiple legal, financial, political, and organizational elements are intertwined, so that any legislation addressing one element while ignoring the rest leaves a loophole through which the original intent of the law can be circumvented. Based on what comparative experiences and legal experts' opinions present, the basic dimensions that any effective legislation must simultaneously address can be summarized as follows:

 

- Direct ownership (percentage of shares): This is the traditional starting point, as reflected in Lebanon’s proposed 10% ownership cap. However, on its own, it remains a tool with limited effectiveness. 

- Actual control versus nominal ownership: A shareholder holding less than 10% of the shares can exercise complete control over a media institution through shareholder agreements, preferred shares, or financial or political influence, whereas another shareholder with a much higher percentage may not possess any real ability to influence its decisions.

- Indirect ownership and beneficial ownership: Through holding companies, proxies, or family members, allowing an actual owner to remain outside the circle of official disclosure.

- Cross-ownership between media types: Meaning the concentration of control over more than one type of media simultaneously (television, radio, press, digital platforms), which grants a single owner influence that exceeds any single market share.

- The organization’s financing and its sources: As the actual funder may be more influential than the registered owner, as detailed above.

- Family and political ties and shared economic interests: Which allow influential entities to exercise indirect influence without appearing in any official ownership structure.

- The criterion of actual influence on public opinion (audience share): Instead of merely relying on the share percentage, as adopted by Germany, where the degree of dominance is measured based on the institution's share of the audience rather than just its share in capital.

- The independence of the media authority and its actual execution capability: This includes the authority to uncover beneficial ownership, monitor funding, and impose sanctions, isolated from any political influence in the appointment of its members.

 

In conclusion, the success of any legislation aimed at protecting media pluralism should not be measured by how strict the ownership cap is, but rather by its ability to close all possible avenues for circumventing it simultaneously. 

 

A Legal Approach to Protecting Pluralism

Amid the ongoing debate over the effectiveness of the proposed restrictions on media ownership, legal experts explain that these safeguards are not new to Lebanese legislation. Rather, they are based on principles and standards adopted by many democracies to protect media pluralism.

 

A Legislative Basis in Place Since 1994

Legal expert and former MP Ghassan Moukheiber explains, in an interview with Maharat, that it is important to note that the limits imposed on share ownership in Lebanon are already part of the provisions currently in force under the Audiovisual Media Law No. 382 dated 4 November 1994. Article 13 of this law limits ownership to 10% of the shares in television media companies. Accordingly, the provisions included in the proposed new law do not introduce this principle for the first time; rather, they reaffirm the existing legislative framework in this area. 

 

Article 13:

All shares of the company shall be registered shares, and shareholders must meet the following conditions:

 - A natural person must be Lebanese, have full legal capacity, and must not have been convicted of a felony or an offense involving moral turpitude, or deprived of their civil rights.

- A legal person must be a wholly Lebanese company whose articles of association prohibit the transfer of shares to persons other than Lebanese natural persons or wholly Lebanese companies. 

- No single natural or legal person may directly or indirectly own more than 10% (ten percent) of the total shares of the company. The spouse, as well as their ascendants and minor descendants, shall be considered as one person for the purposes of this provision. 

 

Regarding the justifications on which these restrictions are based, Moukheiber points out that international jurisprudence, comparative judicial rulings, and the recommendations of specialized international organizations, foremost among them UNESCO, unanimously agree that media outlets, especially television, are not merely commercial projects, but institutions that directly influence the formation of public opinion, the democratic trajectory, election results, and the shaping of national culture.

 

From this perspective, protecting media pluralism has come to be considered a positive obligation falling upon the state, and not just a political choice. He adds that the majority of democratic states do not leave the issue of media ownership to market rules alone, but rather adopt special legislation aimed at preventing monopolies or limiting excessive concentration in ownership or control.

 

At the same time, he points out that there is no single international model imposing a specific ownership cap. However, the 10% threshold proposed in Lebanon is not inconsistent with the philosophy of comparative legislation, which seeks to dismantle centers of media influence. To achieve this objective, countries adopt various approaches, including setting limits on share ownership or voting rights, subjecting mergers and acquisitions to special oversight beyond ordinary competition rules, restricting cross-ownership between different types of media—including television, newspapers, radio, and media platforms—and adopting criteria based on actual influence over public opinion rather than share ownership percentages alone.

 

Comparative jurisprudence has gone even further. The German Federal Constitutional Court has held, in a series of landmark decisions, that the state’s role is not limited to refraining from interfering with media freedom, but also includes a positive obligation to prevent the emergence of media power centers capable of monopolizing the formation of public opinion. The European Court of Human Rights has affirmed the same principle, recognizing that protecting media pluralism is an integral part of protecting freedom of expression, and that states may adopt legislation limiting media ownership concentration when such restrictions are provided for by law, proportionate, and aimed at safeguarding pluralism.

 

UNESCO and the Council of Europe have likewise emphasized that media pluralism is not achieved merely through the existence of a large number of media outlets. It also requires genuine diversity of ownership, full transparency regarding the identity of owners and beneficial owners, as well as preventing the concentration of economic or political control over the media.

 

 

Actual control, not nominal ownership, is the decisive criterion

From this perspective, Moukheiber emphasizes that setting a 10% ownership cap can be justified as a measure to protect media pluralism. However, it does not necessarily constitute the only, or even the most effective, tool to achieve this objective. A shareholder owning less than 10% of the shares may still exercise effective control over a media organization through shareholder agreements, shares carrying special rights, or financial or political influence, while another shareholder holding a significantly larger stake may have no actual ability to influence the organization’s decisions.

 

For this reason, modern best practices tend to rely on a comprehensive set of tools, including establishing limits on effective control rather than merely on nominal ownership; requiring media organizations to disclose their actual owners and ultimate beneficial owners; regulating cross-ownership across different media sectors; subjecting mergers and acquisitions to an assessment of their impact on media pluralism, rather than solely on economic competition; adopting criteria linked to audience size or media influence when assessing cases of concentration; and ensuring the protection of editorial independence even where major shareholders are present. All these provisions should be subject to the oversight of a regulatory authority, which is represented in the Lebanese draft law by the National Media Council.

 

Moukheiber notes that while some critics consider the imposition of media ownership caps to be an unjustified interference with investment freedom, comparative experiences and legislation demonstrate that such restrictions are not exceptional. Rather, they reflect an established regulatory approach applied in many sectors where ownership concentration may create risks affecting the public interest.

 

Why is the Media Treated like Banks and Telecommunications?

According to Moukheiber, restrictions on media ownership are not, in principle, different from those applied in other sectors of public importance. In the banking sector, for example, in most legal systems, no person may acquire or increase a significant stake in a bank without prior approval from regulatory authorities, even if such a stake falls below the legal control threshold, because banks are not merely private companies; they are institutions that directly affect financial stability and the national economy. In many countries, holdings of 10%, 20%, 30%, or 50% are subject to different levels of regulatory approval, as such stakes may grant their holders significant influence even without majority ownership. Similarly, many legal frameworks impose comparable restrictions on control in sectors such as telecommunications, energy, civil aviation, defense, and critical infrastructure, subjecting acquisitions in these fields to specific government oversight due to their potential impact on national security or the public interest.

 

In the media sector, Moukheiber explains that its particular nature lies in the fact that it does not merely involve the management of funds or infrastructure; rather, it directly affects the formation of public opinion, the democratic process, elections, and political and cultural pluralism. For this reason, comparative legal scholarship considers that the risks arising from the monopolization of media influence may, in some cases, exceed those associated with economic monopolies, as they affect one of the fundamental pillars of a democratic system: citizens’ right to access diverse and independent information and viewpoints.

 

From this perspective, restrictions on the concentration of media ownership are not fundamentally different from restrictions imposed on the ownership of banks, telecommunications companies, or other institutions of public importance. Their purpose is not to undermine property rights or restrict investment freedom, but rather to prevent the concentration of influential power in the hands of a limited number of individuals when such concentration could harm the public interest.

 

 

In conclusion, Moukheiber believes that the question the Lebanese legislator should ask is not limited to whether the 10% ceiling is high or low, but rather lies in the ability of the legal system as a whole to actually prevent the concentration of media power. If this ceiling can be circumvented through shareholder agreements, indirect ownership, the use of proxies, or actual control over management and editorial policy, then specifying a numerical percentage, no matter how high or low, will not achieve the desired goal. However, if this ceiling is coupled with clear and transparent rules for disclosing true owners, and controls limiting actual control and cross-ownership, in addition to granting the National Media Council effective powers to monitor operations of ownership concentration, it would form part of an integrated system to protect media pluralism.

 

For his part, legal expert Dr. Tony Mikhael confirms that the fundamental problem does not lie in the size of share ownership itself, but in the criterion of actual control over the media institution. A person may own only 10% of the shares, but in reality exercises complete control over the company through agreements with other shareholders, via the board of directors, or through funding. Conversely, another person might own 40% of the company's shares or more, without having actual control over the institution, if decisions are in the hands of other shareholders or a majority of shareholders. He adds that the principle that should be enshrined is allowing the investor to exercise control over only one media institution, without this control extending to other media outlets. If this control expands to include additional media institutions, the National Media Council should intervene to evaluate the extent of its impact on media pluralism and take the necessary actions in accordance with the provisions of the law.

 

 

The Institutional Safeguard: A Truly Independent Media Authority

For his part, Marius Dragomir, the European expert at the Media and Journalism Research Center (MJRC), clarifies that the effective application of rules limiting the concentration of media ownership rests, first and foremost, on the existence of an independent regulatory body immune to government interventions and political appointment cycles. An authority appointed by the government and subject to its control cannot reliably monitor cases of ownership concentration that might serve that government's interests. He also indicates that the Council of Europe views the transparency of media ownership and the restrictions imposed on its concentration as essential conditions for enabling citizens to form their opinions, express them, and exchange information freely, based on the premise that ownership structures directly affect the editorial policies of media institutions.

 

 

European Models: How Do Other Countries Address the Issue?

Alongside the ongoing debate in Lebanon, European experiences provide different models for regulating media ownership. Mechanisms to limit ownership concentration are not confined to setting ownership thresholds; they also extend to assessing the actual influence that media organizations exert in shaping public opinion.

 

Dragomir explains that imposing structural restrictions on media ownership is a common feature of broadcasting regulation in European democracies, although the mechanisms adopted vary from one country to another.

 

Germany: Audience Share as a Criterion Rather Than Capital Ownership Percentage

Dragomir notes that Germany adopts an approach based on measuring ownership concentration through a test that considers audience share and influence over public opinion, rather than relying solely on limits on capital ownership. This framework was designed to prevent any company from acquiring a dominant influence over public opinion. A 30% audience share is considered the key threshold triggering regulatory intervention, while this threshold is lowered to 25% if the company also holds a dominant position in other relevant media markets. Channels are attributed to companies according to ownership and control rules applied by the Commission on Concentration in the Media (KEK).

 

France: Capital Ownership Caps and Cross-Ownership Rules

In France, Dragomir points out that legislation includes specific rules aimed at limiting media ownership concentration, including a cap of 49% on capital ownership and voting rights in companies holding a license for national terrestrial television broadcasting when their average annual audience share exceeds the threshold established by law. France also applies rules regulating cross-ownership, alongside specific safeguards to protect local television services.

 

The Common Lesson: Any Fixed Ownership Cap Can Be Circumvented

Dragomir emphasizes that European experiences show that setting a fixed ownership threshold is among the easiest rules to formulate from a legal perspective, but it is also one of the most vulnerable to circumvention. Effective control can be exercised through proxies, family members, holding companies, or cross-financing arrangements, with each individual stake remaining formally below the established threshold.

 

For this reason, the most advanced regulatory systems are moving toward complementing, or replacing, traditional ownership caps with tests based on audience share or the ability to influence public opinion. These approaches assess the actual influence exercised by a media organization rather than merely its formal ownership structure. Such mechanisms are also accompanied by requirements to disclose ultimate beneficial ownership, enabling regulatory authorities to identify the actors who exercise real control over media organizations.

 

Conclusion: Pluralism as a Shared Responsibility

Ultimately, the debates surrounding the new Media Law proposal, together with international experiences and expert opinions, show that the real challenge does not lie in setting the ownership cap at 10%, but rather in the ability of the legal framework to prevent the concentration of media influence and ensure pluralism. Protecting media pluralism cannot be achieved merely by establishing a legal ownership threshold; it requires a comprehensive system based on ownership transparency, disclosure of beneficial owners, transparency regarding sources of financing, oversight of effective control and cross-ownership, as well as an independent regulatory authority with the necessary powers to enforce the law effectively.

 

As Parliament awaits a decision on these issues, citizens—as the primary and ultimate beneficiaries of a free and pluralistic media environment—have a role to play in following this debate and advocating for legislation that genuinely ensures that the information they receive is the product of genuine diversity of voices, rather than a reflection of the interests of a limited number of owners and funders.

 

This report was prepared as part of the project “Support to Media Reform in Lebanon to Enhance Freedom of Expression,” with the support of the European Union.